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Radio Broadcast (Oct. 1, 2019): Talking Foreign Policy: The Rohingya Genocide

Talking Foreign Policy Transcript

October 1, 2019, broadcast: ”The Rohingya Genocide”1
Talking Foreign Policy is a one-hour radio program, hosted by Case Western
Reserve University School of Law Co-Dean Michael Scharf, in which
experts discuss the salient foreign policy issues of the day. The quarterly
broadcast is produced in partnership between Case Western Reserve University, the only US law school with its own foreign policy talk radio
program, and WCPN 90.3 FM Ideastream, Cleveland’s National Public
Radio affiliate. The broadcast on October 1, 2019, addressed the Rohingya
Genocide. Archived broadcasts are available for viewing in video format
online at law.case.edu/TalkingForeignPolicy.
Each episode features a regular cast of participants, with Scharf serving
as host:
• The ethicist: Shannon French, director of Case Western
Reserve’s Inamori International Center for Ethics and Excellence;
• The military expert: Mike Newton, professor of law at
Vanderbilt University;
• The international law professor: Milena Sterio, law professor
at Cleveland State University; and
• The negotiator: Paul Williams, president of the Public International Law and Policy Group.
Participants
Todd Buchwald
Jenny Domino
Michael Scharf
Rebecca Hamilton
Paul Williams
scharf: According to a recent UN report, Facebook bears responsibility

for the worst humanitarian disaster on the planet—the mass attacks against the
Rohingya people of Burma. Welcome to Talking Foreign Policy. I’m your host,
1. Transcript edited and footnotes added by Senior Cox International Law Center Fellow
Laura Graham and Cox International Law Center Fellows Kathryn Meyer, Tessa Oates, and
Natalie Davis.
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Michael Scharf,2 dean of Case Western Reserve University School of Law.
In this broadcast, our expert panelists will help us understand the Rohingya
crisis, the role of Facebook, and the prospects for achieving accountability
for the international crimes that have been committed against the Rohingya
people in Burma. Joining us today in our studio is Dr. Paul Williams,3 the
founder of the Public International Law and Policy Group, a Nobel Peace
Prize nominated NGO that was commissioned by the US Department of State
to document the Rohingya crisis last year. Welcome back to our show, Paul.
williams: Thanks, Michael. It’s a pleasure to be here.
scharf : We’re also joined by Professor Milena Sterio4 of Cleveland

State’s Marshall College of Law, who has an award-winning new book out
by Cambridge University Press on international criminal law. It’s good to
have you back on the show too, Milena.
sterio: It is great to be here.
scharf: We also have a newcomer, Professor Rebecca Hamilton5 of

American University Washington College of Law, who is one of the nation’s
leading experts at the role of social media in inciting atrocities. Prior to
becoming a law professor, Rebecca was a prosecutor at the International
Criminal Court, and a foreign correspondent for The Washington Post.
Welcome to Talking Foreign Policy.
hamilton: So glad to be here.
scharf: Our final panelist for the start of our show is Todd Buchwald,6

the former US Ambassador for Global Criminal Justice, who has just com2. Michael Scharf, Case Western Reserve School of Law, https://law.case.edu/Our
-School/Faculty-Staff/Meet-Our-Faculty/Faculty-Detail/id/142. Michael Scharf is the
dean of Case Western Reserve University School of Law. He has also written and published extensively in the area of international law.
3. Paul Williams, American University Washington College of Law, https://www.wcl
.american.edu/community/faculty/profile/pwilliams/bio. Paul Williams is a professor at
American University Washington College of Law. He is also the president of the Public
International Law and Policy Group, a Nobel Peace Prize nominated NGO that has provided legal counsel in a dozen peace negotiations over the past twenty-two years.
4. Milena Sterio, Cleveland Marshall College of Law, https://www.law.csuohio.edu
/newsevents/featuredfaculty/milena-sterio. Milena Sterio is the associate dean of Cleveland-Marshall College of Law and a renowned international law expert.
5. Rebecca Hamilton, American University Washington College of Law, https://www
.wcl.american.edu/community/faculty/profile/rehamilton/bio/. Rebecca Hamilton is an
assistant professor at American University Washington College of Law and an expert in
citizen activism and international law.
6. Todd Buchwald, The Wilson Center, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/person/todd
-buchwald. Todd Buchwald is a former ambassador and Special Coordinator for Global
Criminal Justice at the US Department of State.
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pleted a year’s fellowship at The Wilson Center in Washington, DC, and
is currently a visiting professor of international law at the University of
Oklahoma College of Law. Welcome back to the show, Todd.
buchwald: Thank you, Michael. It’s great to be here.
scharf: And then in the second segment, we’re going to be joined by Jenny

Domino,7 the Satter Fellow at Harvard Law School, and she has worked on
hate speech on Facebook in Myanmar. So without further ado, let’s start out
by looking at this issue, and we’ll begin with some background. There are
some words here that we need to get a common understanding of and even
a pronunciation. Let’s start with the Rohingya. That’s what I’ve been calling
it. It’s not a household word. In fact, when I looked it up how to pronounce
it, I learned that in America, they usually call them the “Roe-hing-a,” but
in the country, they call them the “Roe-hinge-a,” and we’ll start with calling them the “Roe-hing-a,” since we are in the United States, but we will
know that.8 The other thing is the country where this is all taking place,
Myanmar is also known as Burma, and we’ll go with Burma. Let’s start out
with Milena. Tell us about who the Rohingya people are.
sterio: Sure. The Rohingya are a Muslim minority group.9 Most of

them used to live in the western coastal state of Rakhine in Myanmar, or
Burma, as you explained.10 They have been persecuted within Burma for a
number of years. Under Burmese law, they are not officially recognized as
one of the 135 official ethnic groups.11 They have been denied citizenship
in Myanmar since 1982, which has effectively rendered them stateless, and
recently, many of them have experienced severe persecution and have fled
to the neighboring Bangladesh.12
scharf: Explain to us the history of why these people are so hated in

their own country.
7. Jenny Domino, LinkedIn, https://www.linkedin.com/in/jenny-domino-a184ba153/.
Jenny Domino is a former Satter Fellow at the Harvard Law School Human Rights Program and is a current associate legal adviser at the International Commission of Jurists.
8. English Pronunciation of Rohingya, Cambridge Dictionary, last accessed Oct. 24, 2019,
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/pronunciation/english/rohingya.
9. Center for Migration Studies, “The Stateless Rohingya in Thailand,” https://cmsny.org
/the-stateless-rohingya-in-thailand/.
10. Chris Lewa, “North Arakan: An Open Prison for the Rohingya in Burma,” Forced
Migration Review 32 (2009): 11.
11. Azeem Ibrahim, “Myanmar Wants to Track Rohingya, Not Help Them,” Foreign Policy,
Aug. 1, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/01/myanmar-wants-to-track-rohingya
-not-help-them/.
12. Center for Migration Studies, supra note 9.
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sterio: The Rohingya were originally from Bengal, which is now

known as Bangladesh, and the British—these were all British colonies—
brought the Rohingya to Myanmar during the colonial period back in the
1880s.13 Now, during World War II, the Rohingyas mostly supported the
British forces, whereas the other ethnic groups from Burma, who were
Buddhists, supported the Japanese.14 So there’s some animosity that goes
way back to World War II. After Myanmar’s independence post-World War
II, the Rohingya were not officially recognized and have been essentially
discriminated against ever since. Starting in 1982, they were denied a status
of an official ethnic group in Burma, which has effectively rendered them
stateless.15 The latest violence against them was sparked by the killing of
nine Burmese border police officers in October of 2016, and the Burmese
government blamed the Rohingya group as the culprits,16 which then
culminated in the more severe persecution of the Rohingya over the last
three years.
scharf: And where is the Rohingya crisis centered now?
sterio: Hundreds of thousands of Rohingya refugees have fled to the

neighboring country of Bangladesh, and many of the Rohingya refugees—900,000 of them—live in a place called Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh.17
But the flight of the Rohingya really started back in the 1970s, and since
the 1970s, nearly one million Rohingya refugees have fled Myanmar due
to widespread persecution.18
scharf: Alright, so it’s a horrible situation. In a minute, we’re going to

talk about whether this violence can rise to the level of genocide, but to set
the stage for that, Milena, can you tell us what the definition of genocide is?
sterio: Sure, genocide is defined in the so-called Genocide Convention,
which was signed back in 1948 and came into effect in 1951 as an act committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic,
13. Id.
14. S. G. Jilanee, “The Rohingya Massacre,” South Asia, Sept. 30, 2019, Lexis.
15. Center for Migration Studies, supra note 9.
16. “Myanmar Policemen Killed in Rakhine Border Attack,” BBC, Oct. 9, 2016, https://
www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37601.
17. “Rohingya Emergency,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, https://www
.unhcr.org/en-us/rohingya-emergency.html.
18. “Who are the Rohingya?,” Al-Jazeera, Apr. 18, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com
/indepth/features/2017/08/rohingya-muslims-170831065142812.html.
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racial, or religious group.19 This is a fairly narrow definition entails the
committing of a killing or another heinous act, but it has to be directed
at somebody who’s a member of one of these protected groups: a national,
ethnic, racial, or religious group, and the person has to be targeted because
of their membership in the protected group.20
scharf: I mentioned at the top of the show that we have Paul Williams

with us. He is the president of the NGO, the Public International Law and
Policy Group. Paul, I understand that your NGO was commissioned by
the US Department of State to undertake a study of the violence against
the Rohingya just last fall, and I understand that your team went over to
Bangladesh and interviewed one thousand Rohingya refugees. Can you
tell us what you discovered?
williams: Yes, Michael. We pulled together a team of a dozen and a

half investigators with experience at the various international criminal
tribunals, and we spent two months in the refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar.21
We interviewed over a thousand, actually, 1,024 of the refugees, 15,000
pages of documentation, and we identified over 13,000 crimes that had been
committed against these people.22 What we had discovered was basically,
in sum, that it was a premeditated and well-coordinated operation that was
intended not only to expel, but to exterminate the Rohingya.23 We did a
follow up report, where we conducted a legal analysis, and here we brought
together a dozen former US government lawyers from the Department of
Defense, the White House, and the State Department, and we said, “Look
at this evidence in the way that you would look at it if you were still in the
US government. Be critical, be jaundiced, be very focused on whether or
19. United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, Art. II., 78 UNTS 276.
20. Id., See also: Todd Buchwald and Adam Keith, “By Any Other Name: US Government
Statements about ‘Genocide,’” United States Holocaust Museum (March 2019): 11, https://
www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/Todd_Buchwald_Report_031819.pdf.
21. Paul R. Williams and Jessica Levy, “Atrocities Documented, Accountability Needed:
Finding Justice for the Rohingya through the ICC and Independent Mechanism,” Harvard
Human Rights J., Feb. 25, 2019, https://harvardhrj.com/2019/02/atrocities-documented
-accountability-needed-finding-justice-for-the-rohingya-through-the-icc-and
-independent-mechanism-by-paul-r-williams-jessica-levy.
22. Id.
23. “Documenting Atrocity Crimes Committed Against the Rohingya in Myanmar’s
Rakhine State: Factual Findings and Legal Analysis Report,” PILPG (2018): 50–51, http://
pilpg.org/rohingya-report, archived at https://perma.cc/NKR2-S6W7.
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not, don’t apply your NGO lens, apply your government lens.”24 And they
came back and said, “Crimes against humanity, war crimes,” and they even
came back and said, “This amounts to potential genocide.”25
scharf: Wow. They call it the “G-word.” It’s very powerful. What

happened when you told the State Department—who had asked you to
create this report—that you believed, based on the evidence, that they
should say that this is genocide?
williams: The State Department, I believe, was on the cusp of identify-

ing these atrocities, not only as crimes against humanity, but also genocide,
but then it got caught up in a quintessential one-act play of Washington.
The Secretary of State had a draft speech, and the speech said, “We have
this evidence, we have this documentation, we the State Department find
that there are crimes against humanity and, in brackets, “genocide.”26
They put it in brackets because it was a draft speech and they were still
trying to decide whether or not—in consultation with the legal office and
the political folks—to say genocide.27 A senior staffer then leaked it to the
news media, and that blocked out the ability of the Secretary of State to
make a determination, because he couldn’t go either way. It would look
like he was being manipulated by his own staff and by the news media.
But Capitol Hill stepped in, and the House of Representatives, in a vote
of 394–1, voted that genocide had been committed against the Rohingya,
and encouraged the State Department and the White House to impose
economic sanctions and to pursue criminal accountability.28
scharf: Wow. Alright, Ambassador Todd Buchwald, the US Holocaust

Memorial Museum commissioned you to produce a report, which was
published this past April, on how the State Department has historically
gone about deciding to say, or not to say, that genocide has occurred in a
conflict. Can you summarize what you found and apply it to what Paul
just told us about the Rohingya?
24. Williams and Levy, supra note 21.
25. Id.
26. Nahal Toosi, “Leaked Pompeo Statement Shows Debate Over ‘Genocide’ Label for
Myanmar,” Politico, Aug. 13, 2018, https://www.politico.com/story/2018/08/13/mike
-pompeo-state-department-genocide-myanmar-775270.
27. Id.
28. Letter from Eliot Engle, Chairman, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, et al. to Mike
Pompeo, Secretary of State, US Department of State, Feb. 15, 2019, https://foreignaffairs
.house.gov/2019/2/house-foreign-affairs-committee-leadership-calls-on-administration
-to-recognize-rohingya-genocide.
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buchwald: Thank you, Michael. We spent a lot of time looking at this

in our report, which was commissioned before the events that Paul is talking
about. As it turns out, there is no formal process for making determinations
about genocide.29 You can’t find a regulation or a department procedure, but
there’s a kind of de facto process that has emerged that you can glean from
looking at the way the issue’s been handled in the past. And in the modern
era since Yugoslavia and Rwanda, that have framed the way that the process
has developed.30 In the Rwanda and Bosnian genocides, in both those cases,
what you had was a senior level of leadership in the Department that was
resistant to saying a genocide had occurred because they were afraid of being
cornered into doing things that they didn’t want pressure to do, and lowerlevel people using the idea of a genocide determination trying to press the
department principles to make it, to make the determination, writing memos
up to the seventh floor to the department principles, and the department
principles resisting.31 Then, fast forward to the next major episode, which
was the Darfur genocide in determination in 2004, and you had—
scharf: Let me stop you there, because we actually have with us Professor

Rebecca Hamilton, whose book, Fighting for Darfur, is all about why the US
government was willing and able to use the “G-word,” as I say, to describe
Darfur. Can you complete the story that Ambassador Buchwald has begun?
hamilton: By the time that Darfur started unfolding, there had been a

lot of publicity and a lot of work done by journalists that, I think, recounted
just the extent of the US government’s failings in Rwanda ten years earlier,
and that weighed very heavily on people in the State Department, including
then Secretary of State Colin Powell, who really took this on as his issue
and decided to hold off for a genocide.32
scharf: So what is it about the word genocide that the State Department

is so afraid of? Ambassador Buchwald?
buchwald: Well, I think it goes back to what we saw in the Bosnia

and Rwanda era, where the Department leadership, the administration
29. Todd Buchwald and Adam Keith, “By Any Other Name: US Government Statements
about ‘Genocide,’” United States Holocaust Museum (March 2019): 3, https://www.ushmm
.org/m/pdfs/Todd_Buchwald_Report_031819.pdf.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Rebecca Hamilton, Fighting for Darfur: Public Action and the Struggle to Stop Genocide,
abstract (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). See also supra note 29 at 8.
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leadership, tends to be risk-averse, and doesn’t want to do something that
will then create pressure on the State Department, on the administration,
to intervene in a way that they’re not prepared to intervene.33
scharf: Are there actual legal obligations if they say it’s genocide, or

is it all politics?
buchwald: There are legal obligations, but when you really get the

“wheat” jobs, it’s scrape the wheat from the chaff. The legal obligations
aren’t what are driving things.34 The legal obligations are fairly minimal,
insofar as it relates to this issue.35 There are, as you know, obligations to
criminalize genocide and so forth, but the big legal question is how to
interpret the obligation to prevent genocide.36 And if you look at the internal
memorandum that the State Department produced in these episodes, and
the advice the lawyers in the State Department were providing, it’s clear
that their view is that the obligation to prevent isn’t an obligation to prevent
in your own country.37 It doesn’t apply offshore, so that’s not it, and that’s
what the department leaders get. But the fact that there’s no legal obligation doesn’t necessarily affect the reality for the policymakers that they
will get political pressure.38 I should also say that the legal interpretation
is not obvious. It’s not actually consistent with decisions, for example, the
International Court of Justice and many scholars, but that is the internal
advice that the lawyers in the department give.39
scharf: Alright, so we’ve gotten to the place where the facts indicate that

it’s genocide—the PILPG, Paul’s NGO, officially declare it to be genocide,
the US Congress says it’s genocide, and reluctantly, the Department of State
allows that to be the last word. Let’s take a short break while we mull over
what that means. When we return, we’ll talk about the role of Facebook
in the Rohingya genocide, and then we’ll finally look at the potential for
prosecutions. We’ll be back in a moment.
scharf: Welcome back to Talking Foreign Policy, brought to you by Case

Western Reserve University and WCPN 90.3 Ideastream. I’m Michael
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Buchwald & Keith, supra note 29.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 53, 61.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 51, 61.
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Scharf, dean of Case Western Reserve University School of Law. We’re
talking today about the atrocities committed against the Rohingya people
of Burma. Before the break we were discussing whether it matters whether
the attacks are called genocide or crimes against humanity. Before we move
on to discuss the role of Facebook, I want to go to Rebecca Hamilton and
have you explore that a little bit further.
hamilton: The decision by the US government to call something geno-

cide—or by any government to call it genocide—makes a huge difference to
victims. So whenever genocide occurs, there is intrinsic value to naming it
by its proper name. And that is something that I have heard from genocide
survivors all around the world. I think it’s a separate question, though, in
terms of the policy impact. I think that a genocide determination ends
up giving people less than they might imagine or hope for. A little bit to
Todd’s earlier point, the US government will go as far as its happy to go.
What we’ve never yet seen is a genocide determination actually impact a
traditional national interest calculation. We haven’t seen it mean that we’re
willing to have US casualties or that the US government is willing to have
it disrupt its key diplomatic relationships.
scharf: Now what’s, in my opinion, the most extraordinary aspect of

this is that this genocide would not have occurred, but for—according to
the UN—the role of Facebook, a US company.40 According to the UN
report, ultra-nationalists use Facebook to incite the violence against the
Rohingya and that Facebook is the only source of news for the majority
of the Burmese people.41 And they also concluded that there was a correlation between the posts on Facebook and the attack. I’m going to bring Jen
Domino in. You’re an expert in this area. Can you tell us more about that?
domino: Thanks for having me on your show. Actually, I just want to

push back a little bit. There are various sources of news, and it was also in the
UN report. So you have a lot of state-owned media in Myanmar, and since
its transition to democracy they’ve also had non-state-owned media.42 But
the difference here is that because state-owned media has a disproportionate
40. Tom Miles, “UN Investigators Cite Facebook Role in Myanmar crisis,” Reuters, Mar.
12, 2018, 5:40 p.m., https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-facebook
/u-n-investigators-cite-facebook-role-in-myanmar-crisis-idUSKCN1GO2PN.
41. United Nations Human Rights Council, “Report of the Independent International
Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar,” ¶¶ 73 & 74, UN Doc. A/HRC/39/64, Sept. 12, 2018.
42. “Myanmar Profile–Media,” BBC, May 2, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world
-asia-pacific-12991727.
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amount of reach and resources compared to non-state-owned media. Facebook becomes more important because it provided a voice to many people,
who, prior to their democratic transition, did not have a space where they
could speak, and so, despite various media sources, leading religious and
government figures still used Facebook, because it allowed them a platform
which was not available to everyone before Facebook came to Myanmar.43
scharf: So you’re saying that it wasn’t the only source of news, but it

was an important source of news, and therefore it became very dangerous
what was being posted. Well, why didn’t Facebook just remove these posts
inciting the violence?
domino: Actually, I also want to add that the government narrative against

the Rohingya had been there for many years. And Facebook—it didn’t start
with Facebook posts—but Facebook provided a tool to reinforce those narratives on a wider scale. And I think, to answer your question, the reason why
Facebook didn’t take down those posts, it wasn’t just on top of their priorities
scharf: They claim they didn’t have translators, they didn’t know that these

inciting words were being said. Is that a credible statement from Facebook?
domino: Well, civil society had alerted them to hate speech on Facebook

for years preceding the attacks. But despite the alerts, Facebook didn’t really
do enough.44 And in a popular interview in Vox last year Mark Zuckerberg
said himself that their systems detected hate speech, but Myanmar civil
society actually corrected him days later and he apologized.45 It was actually
them, and not the algorithms, that detected the hate speech.
scharf: But once they brought it to his attention and he couldn’t escape

from the conclusion being that his Facebook was being used to incite this
kind of violence, he did publicly promise to take action to deal with these
violent posts on Facebook,46 right?
43. “Human Rights Impact Assessment: Facebook in Myanmar,” BSR 7, October 2018,
https://fbnewsroomus.files.wordpress.com/2018/11/bsr-facebook-myanmar-hria_final
.pdf.
44. “Facebook ‘too slow’ in Removing Anti-Rohingya Hate Speech,” Al Jazeera, Aug. 16,
2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/08/facebook-slow-removing-anti-rohingya
-hate-speech-180816093622390.html.
45. Evelyn Douek, “Facebook’s Role in the Genocide in Myanmar: New Reporting
Complicates the Narrative,” LawFare Blog, Oct. 22, 2018, 9:01 a.m., https://www
.lawfareblog.com/facebooks-role-genocide-myanmar-new-reporting-complicates
-narrative.
46. Alexandra Stevenson, “Facebook Admits It Was Used to Incite Violence in Myanmar,” New York Times, Nov. 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/technology/
myanmar-facebook.html.
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domino: Yes. I think by that time though, they began to pay attention

after other scandals had occurred—Cambridge Analytica—and so there
was international pressure on Facebook for a wide range of issues. And at
that time, that’s when they finally said last year that we would be doing
more to tackle this issue.
scharf: But even after he publicly said this in his testimony to the Senate,

Reuters reported the following posts on Facebook in Burma. According
to Reuters, one user posted “We must fight them the way Hitler did the
Jews, damn kalars!”47 which is a pejorative for the Rohingya. Another post
showed a news article from an army-controlled publication about attacks
on police stations by Rohingya militants. “These non-human kalar dogs,
the Bengalis, are killing and destroying our land, our water and our ethnic
people,” the user wrote. “We need to destroy their race.”48 Another user
shared a photo of a boatload of Rohingya refugees landing in Indonesia.49
“Pour fuel and set fire so that they can meet Allah faster,” a commenter
wrote.50
Now, how do those get on Facebook after Zuckerberg says, “I will take
action to prevent that”?51
domino: I think it’s also because Facebook is such a big company. The

policy at the top level is very hard to translate to content moderation
which is done by humans and their technology.52 So it’s just not as fast as
we would want it to be.
scharf: And why didn’t he just completely withdraw Facebook from

Burma?
domino: Well, I wouldn’t support that either. Because Facebook, as I

said, in a country transitioning to democracy, serves a very useful role there

47. Steve Stecklow, “Special Report: Why Facebook is Losing the War on Hate Speech in
Myanmar,” Reuters, Aug. 15, 2018, 3:51 p.m., https://www.reuters.com/article/us
-myanmar-facebook-hate-specialreport/special-report-why-facebook-is-losing-the-war
-on-hate-speech-in-myanmar-iduskbn1l01jy.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Bloomberg Government, “Transcript of Mark Zuckerberg’s Senate hearing,” Washington Post, Apr. 11, 2018, 3:25 a.m., https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch
/wp/2018/04/10/transcript-of-mark-zuckerbergs-senate-hearing/.
52. Douek, supra note 45.
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because people don’t have a space where they could talk.53 There’s still a
lot of self-censorship in Burma, and Facebook provided a space where all
these people previously repressed and silent can finally speak.54
scharf: Alright, well, Facebook—it’s a tool and it can be used for good
or bad. Let me bring Rebecca Hamilton back into this. I understand that
your current research is about how ordinary people in atrocity situations
have actually been documenting the crimes they have witnessed by posting them on social media.55 Is this type of user-generated evidence a good
thing for international justice?
hamilton: It can be. And I think when we’re thinking about Myanmar

it’s very easy to pile on the social media companies and appropriately so, but I
think it’s true that for many vulnerable populations, social media is enabling
them to document the crimes that are happening in their communities and
to broadcast those crimes out to the world and that is especially important
in situations like we see in Syria for example, where the government is not
letting external investigators in.56 Now, whether it’s ultimately going to be
a good thing for international justice? I think it depends. Certainly there’s
a whole lot of security issues, that come with user-generated evidence for
people who are doing that documentation. And it would be really sad if
international criminal investigations prioritize this kind of documentation
over the sort of in-person interviews that are so important for the survivors
of these crimes.
scharf: But what I’m hearing from the two of you though is that it’s

a pretty complicated question about what Facebook ought to be doing in
Burma. It has a good role and has a bad role. It doesn’t necessarily know
all of the ways that it is being abused. Rebecca, what did you want to add?
hamilton: So I’m also in the camp that I think Myanmar wants Face-

book. They just want a better Facebook, right? Okay, but I do think there
are really important questions for not just Facebook but of social media
53. Emilie Lehmann-Jacobsen, “Myanmar’s Media from an Audience Perspective,” IMSFOJO, September 2018, https://www.mediasupport.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09
/Audiences-in-Myanmar_2018_finalweb.pdf.
54. Id.
55. Hamilton, Rebecca J., “User-Generated Evidence,” Aug. 15, 2018, Columbia J.Transnat’l
Law 57, no.1 (2018); Am U., WCL Research Paper No. 2018-11. http://jtl.columbia.edu
/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2019/01/1-Hamilton_UGE-Online.pdf.
56. Id.; See also Rebecca J. Hamilton, “Atrocity Prevention in the New Media Landscape,”
AJIL Unbound 113 (2019): 262, 262.
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companies to be asking before they launch into markets where there isn’t a
strong independent media, where the rule of law is not strong, and where
people are emerging from decades of civil war, and you cannot expect your
product to run in the same way as it does in a liberal democracy, so you
need to put systems in place in advance of going into those markets to be
prepared for what can happen.
scharf: And I suppose you would say, if a very sophisticated company,

a very wealthy company like Facebook did not consider that, that that was
sort of a form of negligence? Inviting this kind of danger?
hamilton: I’m certainly very concerned about it. At the most basic level,

they didn’t even translate their community guidelines.57 The standards for
what you are or are not allowed to post on their site, didn’t translate them
into the local languages.
scharf: Was that willful blindness or was that just laziness?
domino: They translated it, but I think not early enough58
hamilton: Exactly–they didn’t translate it before they went into the

market.
scharf: Okay, so now let’s go back to our expert at the legal aspects of
genocide, Milena Sterio. Is there precedent for prosecuting incitement to
genocide by media owners?
sterio: So there is precedent for prosecuting incitement for genocide, the

first person to be prosecuted for incitement as a hate crime, as a crime against
humanity, was a person called Julius Streicher who was actually prosecuted
at the Nuremberg Tribunal.59 He was the publisher of an anti-Semitic German weekly and he was prosecuted and convicted and sentenced to death at
Nuremberg and at the time, this is prosecuted as a crime against humanity.60
scharf: Now was he prosecuted for the words that he published or for

providing a platform for others to make these genocidal words?
sterio: He certainly did not write all of the words himself, he was the

publisher of the paper. Now, there are other examples from the Rwanda
57. Stecklow, supra note 47.
58. Id.
59. Margaret Eastwood, The Emergence of Incitement to Genocide within the Nuremberg Trial
Process:The Case of Julius Streicher (Edwin Mellen Press, 2006), http://clok.uclan.ac.uk
/19300/.
60. Id.
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tribunal. In the Rwanda Tribunal there were three defendants who were
prosecuted for incitement to genocide.61 Now, these are individuals who
actually spoke words of incitement, that’s a little bit different.
scharf: Anybody who just owned a radio station and allowed the words

to be used.
sterio: Well, according to the Rwanda Tribunal, legal incitement in this

context means encouraging or persuading another to commit an offense
by ways of communication for example, by using broadcast publications,
drawings, images or speeches, and the person who is inciting has to have the
intent for the person receiving this information to commit the genocideelect.62 Now, even if the person receiving the information does not commit
the act, they for some reason decide not to do it, the person who is doing
the incitement can actually still be prosecuted for incitement.
scharf: So could a social media platforms such as Facebook be held

accountable for enabling incitement to genocide?
sterio: The trick here would be, is Facebook encouraging or persuading

anyone to do genocidal things? And I think Facebook would say, “we’re
not encouraging, we’re just this neutral platform.”
scharf: So just being neutral or negligent, as Rebecca was saying, or

just not making the priority as Jen was saying, or not caring. That’s not
enough, you actually have to want it, right?
sterio: I think that could maybe mean entail criminal responsibility
for some kind of criminal negligence but it’s not enough for genocide.
scharf: We’ll ask Jen this. How long did it go on that after the NGOs

told Facebook this was happening, that Facebook continued to ignore the
problem?
domino: To my recollection, they started alerting Facebook as early as

2011, and it was only in 2018 when they started to roll out all these initiatives to improve their content moderation, there.63
61. William A. Shabas, “Hate Speech in Rwanda: The Road to Genocide,” McGill L. J. 46:
141 (2000), https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/mcgil46
&div=20&id=&page=.
62. Richard Ashby Wilson, “Inciting Genocide with Words,” Mich. J. Of Int’l Law 36: 277,
289–290 (2015), http://www.mjilonline.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/06
/Wilson.pdf.
63. Matthew Ingram, “Facebook Slammed by UN for Its Role in Myanmar
Genocide,” Columbia Journalism Rev., Nov. 8, 2018, https://www.cjr.org/the_media_today
/facebook-un-myanmar-genocide.php.

https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/ijel/vol7/iss1/11

14

Radio Broadcast (Oct. 1, 2019): Talking Foreign Policy: The Rohingya Genocide
Talking Foreign Policy Transcripts

105

scharf: At some point, doesn’t negligence, become some kind of mens

rea that’s higher than intent?
sterio: Intent is the highest in criminal law, and in international criminal

law, extremely difficult to prove.64 And as much as I think that there is
criminal negligence on behalf of Facebook or a platform that is similar, I
don’t think that there is genocidal intent to incite violence.65
scharf: Alright, this is interesting. You could prosecute incitement for

some other crime of violence other than genocide where depraved heart
would be enough, right?
sterio: If it’s a lower mens rea—
scharf: But it’s because genocide has the highest level of intent that it’s

so hard to prosecute.66
sterio: Yeah, remember the German publisher at the Nuremburg Tribu-

nal was prosecuted at the time as a crime against humanity, not as genocide,
so there isn’t the same level of strict intent required.67
scharf: Alright, now let me switch back over to Ambassador Todd

Buchwald. What do you think the lessons are for Facebook related to the
atrocities of the Rohingya people in Burma?
buchwald: Right. The thing with the social media companies is the

control that the publisher as opposed to newspapers that control the publisher
has over the content is more remote. But I do think we have to find ways
to incentivize social media to be more vigilant. That’s clearly what has to
happen here, and if it doesn’t, the law will catch up on the intent issues
over time because it sort of can’t go on this way. More broadly, I think that
the issue of whether the incitement or whatever it is, to genocide shouldn’t
depend so much on whether it’s genocide or not genocide. It just really
doesn’t matter. There is a facilitation of horrible atrocities and it’s a mistake
to put too much emphasis on the horror we feel based on whether that
word does or does not fit the legal definition that’s in the 1948 Genocide
Convention.68
64. Mohamed Elewa Badar, The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law:The Case
for a Unified Approach, 412–414 (Hart Publishing, 2013).
65. Wilson, supra note 62.
66. Id.
67. Eastwood, supra note 59.
68. United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Dec. 9 1948, Art. II., 78 UNTS 276.
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scharf : Ambassador, when we were talking earlier about the State

Department’s reluctance to use what I call the “G-word,” it seems that most
of that is political.69 The genocide word has this political power that crimes
against humanity doesn’t have. What you’re saying is a person convicted of
crimes against humanity can spend as much time in jail, and it’s considered
an equally bad crime.70
buchwald: . . . Equally has to be stopped, whether it’s equally—. Those

are questions that, in a way, don’t matter. I mean, they matter to victims,
they have a certain intrinsic importance, but the ultimate thing is that we
have to orient our policy to prevent these things from happening. By the
time there’s a serious question about whether a set of crimes constitutes
genocide, it might or might not constitute genocide, but it’s of a severity that
warrants the kind of vigorous response that shouldn’t depend on whether
the word applies as a technical matter, or not. When the State Department
goes through the process of deciding to say genocide there is historically a
certain reluctance, but there’s historically also a difficulty with the definition. The definition has its own idiosyncrasies that have to be met that
are difficult to meet.71 And if you look at the international court cases, it’s
difficult to show genocide. My point is, don’t let the naming of the crime
have to occur before we’re going to take steps to prevent it.
scharf: Let’s just say this crime is murder. Mass murder.
buchwald: Yeah.
scharf: And it is being committed by using Facebook as an instrument

for inciting it and the owners of Facebook may have been so negligent that
it is a level of negligence that is depraved heart, that could be incitement
for murder, not genocide but murder. Why didn’t the US take any action
against Facebook? Could it?
buchwald: I’m not sure that anybody in the US government made the

determination about Facebook’s motivations that you just made. Actually,
I don’t really know anything about the motivation to the particular sites.
scharf: Let’s ask our experts Rebecca and Jen. Did anybody in the US

government make those kinds of determinations?

69. Buchwald & Keith, supra note 29.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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domino: Not to my knowledge.
hamilton: This has not come before the US government in the way that

you’ve presented it. And I also was going to add, I’m not sure that criminal
law is the best fit for thinking about Facebook’s responsibility here.72
domino: I agree with her on that.
scharf: Okay, so then what would be . . .
hamilton: I mean, I think civil liability. It’s an interesting—
scharf: So somebody could sue Facebook?
hamilton: Right, and in ways that no matter where you ended up with

the suit, perhaps it would incentivize Facebook—looking forward as they
go into other markets—to be really sure that they have the cultural competence to understand how their platform might be used in that market.73
scharf: Did anybody bring such a suit?
domino: No, not yet, but that’s the problem. So just to support what

Rebecca said, the problem, there’s an obsession now with conceptualizing
harm in terms of criminal law that in other discourses such civil liability
are eclipsed. And so the problem is under international law, there’s no
equivalent tort that could somehow conceptualize the harm that companies
like Facebook, exercise on the global stage.74
hamilton: And just to be clear, I think there’s absolutely a crucial

international criminal law conversation to be had around this situation for
the individual perpetrators of the genocide, but that may not be the right
fit, and I personally don’t think it is the right fit, for where Facebook sits
within this landscape.75
scharf: Okay, well, it is time for another short break and we will have

that conversation here, on Talking Foreign Policy when we return back in
a moment.
72. Oona A. Hathaway, Paul K. Strauch, Beatrice A. Walton, Zoe A.Y. Weinberg, “What Is
A War Crime?,” 44 Yale J. Int’l l. 53, 75 (2019).
73. Ingrid Burrington, “Could Facebook Be Tried For Human-Rights Abuses?,” Atlantic
(Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/12/could
-facebook-be-tried-for-war-crimes/548639/.
74. Id.
75. Jordan J. Paust, “The Need for New US Legislation for Prosecution of Genocide and
Other Crimes Against Humanity,” Vt. Law Rev. 33 (2009): 717, https://lawreview
.vermontlaw.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/17-Paust-Book-4-Vol-33.pdf.
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scharf: This is Michael Scharf and we’re back with Talking Foreign
Policy. I’m joined today by some of the world’s foremost international law
and human rights experts, and we’ve been talking about the genocide of
the Rohingya people in Burma. In this final segment of our broadcast,
we’ll look at efforts to bring the perpetrators of some of the worst atrocities seen in years to justice. Let’s begin with Dr. Paul Williams. Paul, can
you tell us what, if any, efforts are currently ongoing to pave the way for
accountability for these atrocity crimes in Burma?
williams: Well Michael, I’m almost certain that in the very near future

we will have some degree of accountability because there are intense efforts
to hold those responsible at the military and at the political level for these
atrocities that have been committed against the Rohingya. The UN Human
Rights Council has a commission of inquiry, which has been very active,
and recently issued yet another report finding not only that genocide had
occurred but that there are 600,000 Rohingya still in Burma living under
the threat of genocide.76 There’s also increased domestic documentation
in the refugee camps themselves. The Rohingya are themselves learning
how to use social media and other tools to document what has happened
to them and what is an ongoing crisis and an ongoing crime.77 And the
Bangladesh government was very clever in finding a way of getting this
case before the International Criminal Court.78 Now there’s a narrow
jurisdictional ban but we can come back to that, and then finally there is
something called the Independent International Mechanism for Myanmar
which is gathering evidence and preparing cases that could then be picked
up by an international court, hybrid tribunal, or domestic prosecutions.79
scharf: And what’s interesting to me about the description of all the

players that you just gave us- none of them were created by the UN Security
Council. And I want to go back to Ambassador Buchwald. You were at the
State Department during the creation of the special investigative commission
76. UN Press Release, “Myanmar’s Rohingya Persecuted, Living under Threat of Genocide, UN Experts Say,” Sep. 16, 2019, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages
/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24991&LangID=E.
77. Laignee Barron, “Meet the Woman Documenting Sexual Violence Against Myanmar’s
Rohingya,” Time, Mar. 27, 2019, https://time.com/5559388/razia-sultana-rohingya
-myanmar-sexual-violence-documentation/.
78. Michael Safi, “ICC Says It Can Prosecute Myanmar for Alleged Rohingya Crimes,”
Guardian, Sep. 6, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/06/icc-says-it-can
-prosecute-myanmar-for-alleged-rohingya-crimes.
79. Williams & Levy, supra note 21.
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by the Security Council for the Former Yugoslavia. You were there when
they created a special commission to investigate Rwanda. Why is the Security
Council not involved in the creation of these mechanisms for Burma?
buchwald: There’s clearly not enough consensus within the Security

Council to make it happen and I think as the United States and other
permanent members of the Security Council chart a Security Council
policy going forward they need to take account of the fact that if they’re
not willing to act, the playing field will shift to other bodies.
scharf: Is there a country that is threatening the veto? I mean, you’re

being very diplomatic, what’s really going on?
buchwald: It’s very hard to get consensus from the Russians and the
Chinese80 and this administration if you sort of think about possible scenarios, including a referral by the Security Council to the International
Criminal Court, it’s hard to imagine this administration in support.
scharf: But looking at the situation in Syria as a comparison, it was

Russia that blocked any investigative commission from being created for
Syria through a veto. Is that right?81
buchwald: It was Russia and China.82
scharf: Okay and then in that case I think that was the first time in

modern times the General Assembly decided to create the commission
the triple-I-M it’s called.83 And now it’s the Human Rights Council that’s
creating the double-I double-M.84 If you’re in this area they have initials
for everything, but Paul just explained to us what that stood for. And you’re
describing that, Ambassador, as a shift of power away from the Security
Council.
buchwald: And a consequence of the Security Council not stepping up
to the plate. If in a big international system if an important player isn’t doing
80. “UN Security Council Mulls Myanmar Action; Russia, China Boycott Talks,” Reuters,
Dec. 17, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-un/u-n-security
-council-mulls-myanmar-action-russia-china-boycott-talks-idUSKBN1OG2CJ.
81. “Russia and China Veto UN Resolution Against Syrian Regime,” Guardian, Oct. 4,
2011, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/05/russia-china-veto-syria
-resolution.
82. Id.
83. “Syria: UN Approves Mechanism to Lay Groundwork for Investigations into Possible
War Crimes,” UN News, Dec. 22, 2016, https://news.un.org/en/story/2016/12/548392
-syria-un-approves-mechanism-lay-groundwork-investigations-possible-war-crimes.
84. Human Rights Council Res. 39/2, UN Doc. A/HRC/39/L.22, at 1, Sep. 25, 2018.
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what’s needed, other mechanisms, other vehicles, will be found to make those
things happen. To put pressure on those other vehicles. And the General
Assembly does not have the power to make legally binding decisions like
the Security Council has, but the pressure will be inexorable for the other
bodies in the multilateral assessment to find ways to deal with these issues.
scharf: And what’s interesting about the double-I double-M, that’s the

Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, is that it is mandated
to prepare criminal cases. Isn’t that right?85
buchwald: Yes.
scharf: Which is an unusual thing for one of these bodies coming out

of the Human Rights Council?
buchwald: It’s coming out of Human Rights Council but it’s sort of

modeled on the Syria example and the idea is to move from a human rights
information collecting oriented body, like the fact-finding mission, to a
body whose purpose is to develop sort of evidence and quality input for
what would eventually be a criminal trial.86 Notwithstanding that we don’t
know exactly where that criminal trial will ultimately be held, whether it
be in future Myanmar or a third country or in the International Criminal
Court but the idea of getting the case files ready is an important step.
scharf: Now Paul, you mentioned that the Human Rights Council

had a previous investigative body that was a very public investigation. Is
the double-I double-M a private secretive investigation?
williams: Well the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar

is designed to prepare the actual cases, the profile so to speak, that could
be picked up by some type of prosecutorial mechanism so you won’t see
a lot of release of information or of reports.87 This will be something that
the International Criminal Court or another state which is invoking universal jurisdiction, which Milena is an expert in, if they want to prosecute
a general or a political leader for their responsibility in this genocide or
these crimes against humanity, they can request that file.88
scharf: You know a theme that often comes up in international laws

is the principle of unintended consequences. Is it possible that an unin85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id.
Williams & Levy, supra note 21.
Id.
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tended consequence of creating this new mechanism is that there is now
an information gap for public information and public pressure on Burma
during this period of time?
williams: There’s a risk of that, that’s why I think it’s hugely important to

continue the documentation efforts and in particular to empower Rohingya
NGOs, non-governmental organizations, to do their own documentation
and to keep that flow of information which meets or aspires to meet international standards that can then be used as information or as evidence to
keep that going because that’s part of the victim catharsis process as well
as laying the foundation for eventual accountability.
scharf: Now you spoke of the International Criminal Court, Ambas-

sador Buchwald mentioned it, the International Criminal Court only has
jurisdiction over the state parties when their nationals commit crimes or
when crimes are committed in their territory.89 In this case the nationals
who are being accused are Burmese and Burma is not a state party.90 So
let me turn to Rebecca Hamilton. You previously served as a prosecutor at
the International Criminal Court in The Hague. The ICC recently opened
an investigation into the Rohingya situation, and it was confirmed by the
Pre-Trial Chamber.91 How is that possible given what I just said and what
hurdles does the ICC face in prosecuting this case?
hamilton: Yeah, so the Court has said that the prosecutor can start to

open an investigation and they’ve done this on what is an unusual theory
that the prosecutor presented to the court which is that because Bangladesh, neighboring to Myanmar, is a party to the court and because some
of the crimes, in particular forcible deportation or displacement of the
Rohingya, are not completed until those populations are moved onto the
territory of Bangladesh, that therefore the court can get jurisdiction over
those crimes.92 So we’re not talking about the whole range of crimes that
have been committed against the Rohingya, but those where an element
of the crime was committed on the territory of Bangladesh.93
89. “How the Court Works,” ICC, https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/how-the-court-works.
90. Id.
91. Param-Preet Singh, “ICC Prosecutor Seeking to Investigate Crimes Against
Rohingya,” Human Rights Watch, June 26, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/06/26/
icc-prosecutor-seeking-investigate-crimes-against-rohingya.
92. Michael Safi, “ICC Says It Can Prosecute Myanmar for Alleged Rohingya Crimes,”
Guardian, Sep. 6, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/06/icc-says-it
-can-prosecute-myanmar-for-alleged-rohingya-crimes.
93. Id.
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scharf: So this may be a little technical but forcible deportation is that

part of the crime against humanity, of persecution, or is it part of genocide?
hamilton: Yes, it’s a crime against humanity94 and that is what the

case looks like it will go forward on but we haven’t yet seen what that full
case is going to look like.
scharf: What’s your guess about how likely this would lead to a successful prosecution?
hamilton: So I think the crime base is clearly there from the documen-

tation work that we’ve been discussing, that the fact-finding mission has
done, that Paul’s organization has done. The question—the challenge—
always with these prosecutions is, do you have the linkage evidence to tie
this to an individual perpetrator when, as you highlighted, that perpetrator is going to be someone Burmese who is inside Myanmar? And the
Myanmar government obviously has no interest in seeing accountability
for these crimes.95
scharf: Paul, in your report did you name any names?
williams: We did not publicly name any names in our report.96 As part of

our collection of information and data, plenty of information was provided
about the various units that were engaged in these types of activities.97 We
had a number of former military personnel who had done similar types of
investigations before as part of our investigative team and they asked the
questions with that in mind, thinking specifically of command and control.98
If you identify the unit and then you could track back the orders to see
who the generals were that were either directing or aiding and abetting or
complicit in this genocide.
scharf: Milena Sterio, what would you add to this?
sterio: I think that this is a very interesting case. I think it will definitely

be a difficult case for the prosecutor. I don’t think it’s impossible, but I think
it will be difficult. And as Rebecca mentioned I think the key is going
94. “Crimes Against Humanity,” Trial International, https://trialinternational.org/topics
-post/crimes-against-humanity/.
95. Steve Sandford, “Rohingya End Hard Year Still in Limbo,” Voice of America, Dec. 26,
2018, https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/rohingya-end-hard-year-still-limbo.
96. Williams & Levy, supra note 21.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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to be the linkage evidence, and the key might also be which individual
the ICC actually indicts if there’s a person indicted. Some of the recent
cases at the ICC have demonstrated that it is really difficult to start at the
top. That it is really difficult to start with the indictment of the president,
prime minister, foreign minister. That it might be easier to start with the
mid-level commander, and that evidence might be easier to gather. And
then as Rebecca mentioned, the biggest problem is going to be that the
government of Myanmar is not likely to cooperate at all. The government
of Bangladesh is, but the linkage evidence is certainly not going to be in
Bangladesh; it is going to be within the Myanmar government.
scharf: So as you’ve been describing it, because of the limits of the

International Criminal Court, this cannot be a genocide case. Is it worthwhile for the United States or other countries to try to pursue a genocide
prosecution in some other forum, maybe using universal jurisdiction as
Paul mentioned earlier anybody?
sterio: Well Michael, different countries around the world have universal

jurisdiction statutes, but for the most part universal jurisdiction prosecutions tend to be quite unpopular.99 They’re seen by many as a waste of that
country’s resources, court time, if you’re prosecuting someone who maybe
committed horrible things in Myanmar and Bangladesh but has no connection to your country. So as of now I don’t really see the political will
anywhere to have a national level prosecution. The question might be if
there’s some kind of a hybrid or mixed tribunal set up in the near future,
and we have seen those in Sierra Leone and in other countries.100
scharf: Now Syria is a situation that is quite different than how you

described, and in part that’s because there are refugees both victims and
high-level perpetrators that have found themselves in France and in Germany and in other countries in Europe and they are prosecuting those
people under universal jurisdiction.101
sterio: Yes Michael, there’s a universal jurisdiction case that just recently

began in Germany where there’s a Syrian national who’s being prosecuted
99. “Basic Facts on Universal Jurisdiction,” Human Rights Watch, Oct. 19, 2009, https://
www.hrw.org/news/2009/10/19/basic-facts-universal-jurisdiction.
100. “The Special Court for Sierra Leone,” Human Rights Watch, Apr. 11, 2012, https://
www.hrw.org/news/2012/04/11/special-court-sierra-leone.
101. “Justice for Syria in Swedish and German Courts,” Human Rights Watch, Oct. 3, 2017,
https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/10/03/these-are-crimes-we-are-fleeing/justice-syria
-swedish-and-german-courts.
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in Germany under universal jurisdiction but the difference there is that that
person was actually in Germany already and was arrested in Germany.102
As you said there’s a large number of Syrian refugees in Germany or other
European countries and so that’s quite different than a situation where you
know most of the Rohingya refugees are in Bangladesh or somewhere else.
scharf: At the end of our second segment, Rebecca Hamilton, you

were suggesting that maybe prosecutions are not the best way to handle
this or at least people should start thinking about civil suits. Where do you
see that going?
hamilton: So just to clarify, my position is not that with respect to the

perpetrators of genocide but when we are talking about a company like
Facebook that has facilitated the commission of these crimes.103 I don’t think
intentionally either but that’s where I see a role for civil liability coming
into play. And I think there is a risk that we’re seeing played out in every
country in the world that whenever horrible things happen we think “Oh
we’ve got to turn to the International Criminal Court.” I think we need
to make sure that we have space for other forms of liability as well.
williams: I would just agree with Rebecca and follow up on that that

as a nation we have to decide and as a government whether we’re serious or not about the fact that genocide has been committed against the
Rohingya, that there’s a million refugees, and that there’s you know the
largest refugee camp has been created from this crisis.104 And you know we
have an American company, Facebook, which is complicit in or aiding and
abetting this process.105 We have very vested strategic interests in this part
of the world.106 We’ve been a leader in the past in creating these tribunals.
We’ve got to just throw up our hands and say actually we don’t care or
102. Cathrin Schaer, “Prosecuting Syrian War-Crimes Suspect from Berlin,” The Atlantic,
July 31, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/07/can-germany
-convict-syrian-war-criminals/595054/.
103. Paul Mozur, “A Genocide Incited on Facebook, with Posts from Myanmar’s Military,”
New York Times, Oct. 15, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/technology
/myanmar-facebook-genocide.html.
104. “Rohingya Crisis,” Human Rights Watch, Aug. 25, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/tag
/rohingya-crisis.
105. Tom Miles, “UN Investigators Cite Facebook Role in Myanmar Crisis,” Reuters, Mar.
12, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-facebook/u-n
-investigators-cite-facebook-role-in-myanmar-crisis-idUSKCN1GO2PN.
106. “US Relations with Burma,” US Dept of State, https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations
-with-burma/.
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if we do care we need to promote or need to pursue the civil avenues.
We need to pursue the criminal avenues against the American companies
that are engaged or supporting or allowing this to happen through their
artificial intelligence algorithms and we need to put our shoulder behind
the international mechanisms to hold these folks accountable. We can’t
sort of dabble around well it’s a genocide, well it’s complicated, and I think
this panel has been very assertive and aggressive about how there’s a lot of
avenues that we could be pursuing.
scharf: Let me play devil’s advocate here. Paul, why should the United

States and its people care about something that’s going on way over there
in Burma to some people that we’ve never even heard of before?
williams: Yeah, we just need to make that decision. We care, or we don’t

care. Let’s not pretend to care because then you create the false expectations,
the false hope, and you undermine what the victims really need which is
accountability and justice. So we’re either going to be engaged and we’re
going to occupy the vacuum of stability and security around the globe or
we’re not and somebody else will. And we see what happens when we don’t
take the field and someone else does take the field. You see it in Burma.
You see it in Syria.107 You see it in Yemen.108
scharf: Now Ambassador Buchwald, it was your job to make people

care, right?
buchwald: I think we should care.
scharf: Why?
buchwald: I think it’s a manifestation of our deepest values as a nation
to care about people in a situation like this. It is unconscionable what’s
happening. And it may be far away, but I think if the issue is explained
to Americans—if they’re aware of it—they do care. It’s part of the deepest values of the country. And I don’t think that we can have an effective
foreign policy on human rights from a human rights orientation or from a
security orientation that disregards it. It’s inconceivable to me.
hamilton: We absolutely can and should make the values case for

why we need to care, but I think on top of that there’s a very compelling
107. “Syria Crisis: 8 Years of the Syrian War,” UNHCR, https://www.unhcr.org/ph
/campaigns/syria-crisis-8-years.
108. “Yemen Crisis,” UNICEF, https://www.unicef.org/emergencies/yemen-crisis.
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self-interested case to make. We see this in Syria. When a terrible crime
happens in a country, people flee, and the impact of that migration is felt in
countries around the world.109 And so this idea that something is happening
over there and therefore it doesn’t concern us, that’s just simply not viable
in the world that we live in.
scharf: Paul, you were actually at the refugee camps, right?
williams: Yes, in the refugee camps talking with the Rohingya.
scharf: What did that look like?
williams: It looked like the worst nightmare you can think of with
a refugee camp. There were 900,000 people basically pushed into a very
narrow band of territory with no services whatsoever other than what the
UN had brought was able to bring in.110
scharf: Okay, so in my last minute I want to ask a really controversial

and provocative question: the Prime Minister of Burma, who won the
Nobel Peace Prize and is seen as somebody who is a human rights advocate,
she’s just sitting there letting this happen.111 How is that possible? What
are we to make of that?
sterio: I think, again to go back to the definition of genocide, if you

were to try to charge someone like her for genocide, you’d have to prove
that she had this special intent to destroy in whole or in part the Rohingya
group. So unless you can find, as Rebecca said, the linkage evidence for
that, that is really really hard to prosecute. You can’t prosecute someone for
omission to commit genocide. So I think while she probably should face
some kind of criminal liability, I’m not sure that the International Criminal
Court would be the best institution as of now to prosecute someone like her.
scharf: So international responsibility aside, should we be very unhappy

with her? Does she have any moral responsibility here?
buchwald: We should be very unhappy, yes we should. She has a certain

position. The civilian control over the military is not a concept there, but
109. Jon Stone, “Syrian Refugee Crisis: How Different Countries Have Responded,”
Independent, Sep. 1, 2016, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/syrian-refugee
-crisis-how-different-countries-have-responded-france-lebanon-uk-a7220616.html.
110. Williams & Levy, supra note 21.
111. Hannah Ellis Petersen, “From Peace Icon to Pariah: Aung San Suu Kyi’s Fall from
Grace,” Guardian Nov. 23, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/23
/aung-san-suu-kyi-fall-from-grace-myanmar.
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she doesn’t stand up and she doesn’t add a moral voice to the extent that it
needs to be. And I think if nothing else it’s important to keep both legal
and political pressure on her to do what she can to be a counterweight. She
does carry a sort of moral authority in the world and she needs to use it.
scharf: All right, now that gives us a lot to think about. Our producer

is indicating that it’s time to wrap up our program. This has gone way too
fast, but Paul Williams, Milena Sterio, Todd Buchwald, Jen Domino, and
Rebecca Hamilton thank you all so much for providing your insights on
the crisis in Burma. I’m Michael Scharf, you’ve been listening to Talking
Foreign Policy.

Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2020

27

